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It is unfortunate that bering doesn’t spend more time thinking about 
the implications of his theory for the rationality of religious belief, 
because I  think there are some interesting discussions to be had (see, 
e.g. the essays in Schloss and murray’s The Believing Primate (oxford: 
oxford, 2009), and my essay ‘Does Cognitive Science Show belief in God 
to be Irrational? The epistemic Consequences of the Cognitive Science 
of religion’ (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Aug. 2013)). 
For a  scintillating and entertaining presentation of recent work in the 
cognitive science of religion, bering’s book is a great place to go. but, for 
a thoughtful discussion of the implications of such work, the reader will 
want to look elsewhere.
THorSTeN boTZ-borNSTeIN
Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwait
John R. betz, After Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision of j. G. 
Hamann, Wiley-blackwell, 2009.
betz’s study of the German philosopher Johann Georg Hamann (1730-
1788) sheds light on a  relatively obscure figure usually mentioned in 
connection with the philosophers and linguists Johann Gottfried von 
Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Hamann is a Christian philosopher 
who has been marked by an awakening experience. John betz teaches 
theology at the university of Notre Dame and tackles Hamann from 
a  clearly religious angle, which seems to be in keeping with the book 
series ‘Illuminations’ launched by blackwell. The editors claim that the 
series ‘is unique in exploring the new interaction between theology, 
philosophy, religious studies, political theory and cultural studies’.
In the preface betz explains that the title ‘After enlightenment’ 
is supposed to ‘“get over” and beyond the enlightenment, i.e., over 
and beyond the cherished illusion that reason alone is able to provide 
a sufficient basis for morality or culture’ (p. xii) and refers to Alasdair 
macIntyre’s After Virtue, which was ‘also proposed as a way forward that 
we look again to tradition (which the enlighteners for the most part 
spurned as a source of wisdom)’. The central question is if betz (together 
with blackwell’s book series) is really looking forward or if this post-
secular project is taking us back to a ‘before enlightenment.’
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Taking up Hamann is a  risky choice. betz mentions Isaiah berlin’s 
estimation that the German philosopher is not only an ‘irrationalist’, but 
‘the pioneer of anti-rationalism in every sphere’, For berlin, Hamann was 
simply an anti-modern obscurantist. I understand that betz’s aim is to 
prove the contrary. However, right on page 1 betz explains that he wants 
to steer a  decidedly post-secular and implicitly eschatological course 
‘toward Christ’; and on page 336 we read that ‘reason needs faith and 
the authority of a prophetic tradition to tell it what it is: to tell it that its 
light is not merely a random consequence of material causes, or merely 
pragmatic and instrumental, or merely a function of the will to power, 
but a participation in and reflection of the light of a transcendent logos, 
which allows for varying degrees of luminosity’. Does this mean that 
anybody who has no faith has no reason? And that reasonable people 
must consult with religious ‘authorities’? In that case, this is not the ‘After 
enlightenment’ that I and many others are waiting for.
I have skipped the 335 pages in which betz produces a valuable and 
sophisticated analysis of how reason is for Hamann a matter of language. 
I most often concur, especially when it comes to the clarification of points 
from Hamann’s Aesthetica in Nuce in which Hamann explains that ‘an 
overly rational approach to language renders one incapable of speaking 
with the kind of creative authority with which he himself speaks’ (p. 92). 
However, the insistence on ‘reason being based on faith’ must remain 
disturbing in any academic book. It would have been accurate and 
sufficient to say that for Hamann, language is bound with history and that 
he dissolves the pretensions of pure reason into language and tradition. 
This is what opposes Hamann to enlightenment tendencies; but why is it 
necessary to replace ‘tradition’ with ‘faith’? The passing over of differences 
that distinguish faith from tradition are thus a real shortcoming in this 
book. betz writes that enlightenment held that ‘rational persons (…) no 
longer need to be guided by the heteronomy of faith and tradition, but 
can be guided by – and place their trust in – reason alone’ (p. 4). He 
also finds that ‘postmodernists are missing Hamann’s most fundamental 
point: that the transcendent God is kenotically hidden within language’ 
(p. 338). even if this is what Hamann thought at his time, I would still try 
today to redescribe God and religion in terms of history and tradition – 
be it only in order to save Hamann from irrationalism.
of course, betz’s analysis follows a certain script. At the bottom of 
several of his conclusions is a  misunderstanding of the phenomenon 
of ‘postmodernity’. Again and again the ‘de-centered postmodern 
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situation’ is blamed for the present intolerance towards faith though 
the exact contrary is the case. Hamann is representative of a  counter-
enlightenment and therefore, as betz himself confirms, an early initiator 
of postmodern thought: he is ‘in many ways a  Christian precursor of 
postmodern philosophy’ (p. 19). Towards the end of the book, betz 
reinstates that ‘postmodernity begins with Hamann’s assault upon the 
unmediated self-certainty of the modern subject’ (p. 332). I could not 
agree more. However, from where does the curious expression ‘secular 
postmodernity’ originate (p. 19)? The postmodern option is that of the 
post-secular and this option did not exist in modernity. Postmodernity 
started in 1979 with the Iranian revolution and is thus a gift from religious 
people to the world. It is therefore completely incomprehensible why so 
many religious people (in the West as well as in the middle east) accuse 
postmodernity of secularism when it symbolizes precisely the overcoming 
of secularism and the establishment of a post-secular situation. Though 
betz seems to grasp Hamann’s premature role in this project, he equally 
holds that postmodernity is ‘little more than the logical, nihilistic 
conclusion of secular modernity’ (p. 1). This proposition obviously 
contradicts the preceding one on Hamann.
Postmodern authors like lyotard are put upside down for this purpose. 
betz quotes lyotard’s statement that ‘modernity, in whatever age it 
appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and without discovery 
of the “lack of reality” of reality’. lyotard says this very clearly about 
modernity and not about postmodernity because the latter is supposed to 
bring belief back into modernity. betz acknowledges this when writing 
that ‘the modern world, insofar as it is a secular world, having nothing 
greater worth living for, is not only mindless, heartless and gutless, but 
also – having denied any analogy to the Creator – impotent’ (p. 338). 
Still he decides to act as if lyotard is talking about postmodernity: 
‘And true enough, whether owing to the modern suspension of faith 
or the postmodern absence of faith (whether through Descartes’s 
doubt, Kant’s transcendental idealism, Husserl’s phenomenological 
reduction, Heidegger’s nihilistic ontology, or Derrida’s différance), the 
spectral unreality of things is now what appears’ (pp. 338-39). betz’s 
argumentation is self-contradictory: in an above mentioned passage he 
acknowledged Hamann’s status as a precursor of postmodern thought 
only to present him in the remainder of the book as the opponent of this 
same kind of thinking.
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Apart from that, Derrida’s ‘dark, spectral magic to relinquish any 
claims to reality and vanish like ghosts, torn from any embodiment, into 
an endless chain of signification, where nothing is ultimately significant’ 
(p. 334) is a product of betz’s imagination (or perhaps an overstatement of 
one of bennington’s sentences but certainly not embedded in any genuine 
Derrida research). Would betz not take the entirely unfounded equation 
‘spirituality = faith’ for granted, he could avoid those misinterpretations 
that lead him to the conclusion that anything which contains no faith 
cannot contain truth. It is true that for Derrida, ‘language is essentially, 
for all its non-finite supplementarity, a purely immanent construct that 
reveals nothing outside it’ (p. 337) but this does not mean that inside 
the language game no truth is possible. betz actually refers to Hamann’s 
view of language as ‘a playful response to the speaking of the Word in 
creation’ (p. 162), which brings Hamann closer to Derrida than anything 
else. Play is transcendental and truth and spirituality can be found 
inside the play of language as it plays with traditions and history. betz 
acknowledges even this appropriately when writing that for Hamann, 
‘language is essentially a  dialogical religious phenomenon, and, 
especially in its poetic forms (which retain something of this original, 
creative ‘playfulness’) bears traces of the ‘original supplement’ of the 
Word. Indeed, for Hamann, when language is truly inspired, it is never 
merely human’ (p. 333). betz goes along with Derrida when detecting 
connections between postmodern thought and Hamann’s ‘suspicion 
of metaphysics and all allegedly “pure thought”’ (p. 331). Why, after so 
much parallelism, this sudden u-turn towards Christ? As a  matter of 
fact, in the Aesthetica in Nuce Hamann regrets what he sees as the main 
characteristic of Christian philosophy and metaphysics: ‘Christianity 
therefore does not believe in the doctrine of philosophy, which is nothing 
but an alphabetical script of human speculation (...). It does not believe 
in (...) symbolic elements and password signs (...) not in pythagorean-
platonic numbers.’ (Johann Georg Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and 
Language, Cambridge university Press, 2007, p. 189). Christianity is 
against the ‘theorist’ (p. 278) whereas Hamann praises the rabbi of divine 
reason (rabbiner göttlicher Vernunft) as the ‘accomplished man of the 
letters’ (vollkommenen buchstabenmenschen) (p. 281). These represent 
clear affinities with Derrida.
I can follow betz when he says that for Hamann ‘language is essentially 
a  prophetic revelation of transcendence, of the divine in and through 
the human, including all the contingency and indeterminacy, creativity 
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and eccentricity of human language that this implies’ (p. 337). I am still 
on the same page with betz when Hamann is shown to demonstrate 
that the ‘history of philosophy – in its quixotic quest for transcendental 
purity, apodictic certainty, and epistemological mastery over what is, 
in Kant’s phrase, “completely a priori in our power”’ (p. 332). However, 
the simple equation of tradition with God negates a  large part of this 
playful aspect; here Hamann becomes dogmatic and is linked to the 
above mentioned conclusions of reason based on faith as well as to an 
authoritarian tradition. It remains a truth that a reason based on faith is 
not a reason, which is probably exactly what berlin had in mind when 
uttering his shattering statements about Hamann. However, Hamann 
was against the absolute status of reason and engaged in a brand of self-
critical reasoning that might not be so different from Kant’s. Sure, he had 
some supplementary spiritual and religious input. However, to trace his 
thought back to another absolute instance, to that of faith, and to cry out 
‘is it not time to heed the voice of this prophet?’ (p. 348) does not bring 
us one step further.
There is a  tortuous argument right on the book’s first pages about 
an internal connection between reason and relativism, where betz 
explains that the ‘making absolute’ of reason is ‘hypocritical’ because 
once it is absolute it will – since it is not supported through the ‘higher 
ordination’ of God – sink into cultural-linguistic dependence, prejudices 
and relativism (p. 7). The main purpose of the book is probably to make 
this claim more plausible and to show how Hamann found a  way of 
reacting against this relativism. However, to me, the link between reason 
and relativism did not become more plausible nor am I convinced that 
Hamann looked for reason beyond language and culture; and when he 
looked for God he looked for Him in language and culture.
